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1.1  Introduction 
Between  1840 and  1890 the American  railroad network was constructed, 
creating a transportation  system that linked all but the most sparsely settled 
communities.  By  providing  cheap,  reliable  transportation,  the  railroads 
brought the vast American hinterland into world markets for primary products, 
and thereby played an essential role in American economic development.' Of 
course, the economic significance of railroads was not lost upon public offi- 
cials, and all levels of  government actively  promoted railroad  development. 
The federal government subsidized the railroads through federal land grants, 
often providing more land than the railroad required for its right of way. States 
implemented the land-grant policy by selecting routes and granting other privi- 
leges in the corporate charters of railroad companies. Cities and counties pro- 
vided tax forgiveness and capital subsidies to induce railroads to serve them. 
In  1887 the federal government imposed economic regulation on railroads 
by passing the Interstate Commerce Act. Reflecting the fact that by this time 
the railroad network was essentially complete, research on the economic ef- 
fects of railroad regulation has focused primarily on regulatory issues that arise 
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I. Beginning with the classic works by Fogel (1964) and Fishlow (1965). economic historians 
have vigorously debated the economic significance of the railroads. All analysts agree that a na- 
tional transportation infrastructure wa\ an important element of national economic development. 
and all agree that for most of the nation railroads were the dominant technology. The debate fo- 
cuqes on  the magnitude  of  the economic benefit  from  using  railroads  rather  than  other tech- 
nologies. 
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in a mature industry. Examples are cross-subsidization across commodities and 
communities, the effect of economic regulation on railroad profits, the extent 
to which regulation increased the costs of railroad service, and whether regula- 
tion distorted intermodal choice by shippers.* Likewise, research on the politi- 
cal origins of federal regulation has focused on examining whether the subse- 
quent  effects  on  tariffs  reflected  the  interests  of  the  groups  that  were 
responsible for the passage of the 1887 legislation. The questions addressed in 
this literature are the extent to which regulation reduced the long-haul, short- 
haul rate differential, and whether regulation  served primarily to bring prices 
closer to competitive levels or to make railroad cartels more effective.3 Broadly 
speaking, the primary findings of this research are that the creation of the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission (ICC) led to some amelioration of price discrim- 
ination against communities that were served by a single railroad, that the ma- 
jor interregional railroads also benefited because regulation  helped interstate 
rate-making cartels sustain supracompetitive tariffs between major transporta- 
tion  hubs,  and  that  railroad  regulation  created  substantial  allocative  ineffi- 
ciency after World War I because relative prices across commodities and trans- 
portation modes were not sufficiently closely related to relative costs. 
For the most part, research on the causes and consequences of railroad regu- 
lation has not dealt with the fact that, for three decades before the passage of 
the Interstate Commerce Act, many states regulated tariffs and routes for both 
passengers and freight. Prior to the Civil War, tariffs and routes often were 
specified in a state railroad charter, which took the form of either a state law 
dealing with a particular railroad or a franchise granted by a bureaucracy under 
a general act governing incorporation. Beginning in the 1850s,  but with greater 
intensity after 1865, many states sought to regulate railroad tariffs by legislat- 
ing changes in railroad charters or by establishing a regulatory authority to set 
price ceilings. The economic circumstances  surrounding these actions were 
quite different from those surrounding later federal legislation, for the earlier 
attempts to regulate the industry were undertaken in the midst of rapid exten- 
sion of the national railroad  network.  Hence, in contemplating the establish- 
ment of  regulation  in the middle of  the nineteenth century, states confronted 
another economic issue: whether regulation would inhibit investment in new 
railroad lines. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend research on the political economy of 
railroad  regulation  by  examining the establishment of  state regulation in the 
years surrounding the Civil War. To this end, we address two broad issues. The 
2. Some influential studies of the economic effects of railroad regulation are Friedlaender 1969: 
Levin  1978; MacAvoy  1965; Meyer, Peck, Stenason, and Zwick  1959: Porter  1983; Spann and 
Erickson 1970; Ulen 1982: and Zerbe 1980. 
3. In addition to the references cited in note  1, see also Buck 1913, 1920; Gilligan, Marshall, 
and Weingast 1989; Hilton 1966; Kolko 1965: Miller 1971; and Poole and Rosenthal, chap. 3 in 
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first is to test various versions of the economic theory of regulation by identi- 
fying the ex ante pattern of  support and opposition to regulation among eco- 
nomic interests. An important element of this analysis is to ascertain whether 
the political behavior of citizens in areas unserved by railroads reflected a fear 
that regulation would inhibit railroad investments, and hence the extension of 
service to their communities. The second  issue is whether  regulation,  once 
implemented, slowed the pace of railroad development, as opponents had pre- 
dicted. 
This paper focuses on the revision  of the Illinois Constitution  in  1870 for 
three reasons. First, Illinois was the first state to establish a permanent eco- 
nomic regulatory agency. The legislation implementing the regulatory provis- 
ions  of  the  1870 constitution  was the  subject  of  Munn  v.  Illinois,  the  first 
Supreme Court decision that declared state economic regulation to be constitu- 
tiona1.j Second, Illinois was at an intermediate  stage of railroad development 
in  1870. Some counties were served by multiple railroads, others by  a single 
railroad,  and  still others by  none. Hence, the full spectrum of  shipper con- 
cerns-cartelization  in  competitive  markets,  monopolistic  abuse in  single- 
railroad markets, and retarded development in unserved markets-were  rele- 
vant somewhere in the state. Third, the procedure for ratifying the constitution 
provides a unique opportunity to examine the linkage between economic inter- 
ests and support for regulation. In the referendum  to adopt the constitution, 
citizens voted separately on nine articles, including provisions to establish reg- 
ulation of railroads and grain warehouses. Thus, county-level voting data can 
be used to test how differences in shipper interests were related to local support 
for regulation,  and whether  votes  by  county representatives  to the constitu- 
tional  convention reflected  the  preferences  of  their constituents or diverged 
according to the interests of the railroads. 
Our major findings are as follows. First, regardless of the structure of the 
local railroad market, rural communities throughout the state overwhelmingly 
favored regulation, supporting the hypothesis that most citizens believed that 
regulation would redistribute income from railroads to shippers. Second, sup- 
port for regulation  was significantly weaker in counties without railroad ser- 
vice, which is consistent  with the view that  a substantial minority  of voters 
thought that regulation would retard the extension of the rail network. Third, 
railroad regulation as actually implemented apparently did not inhibit railroad 
investment. Together, these findings are most consistent with the “public inter- 
est” theory of regulation: that it leads to lower prices, but not so low that rail- 
roads could not earn reasonable profits on investment. 
4. Munn v.  Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (I  877).  Munn arose from the widespread refusal of grain ware- 
houses to comply with a statute passed  in I873 that regulated them. As in  other states, the grain 
warehouse law was passed at the same time as the railroad  statute, and the legal challenge to the 
constitutionality of railroad  regulation was rejected by the Court immediately after Munn. For a 
detailed account of the issues in Munn.  see Kitch and Bowler 1979. 16  Mark T.  Kanazawa and Roger G.  No11 
1.2  Legal Background 
In the years immediately after the Civil War, many states, especially  in the 
Midwest, enacted legislation to establish economic regulation of railroads and 
grain warehouses. But durable state regulation  proved to be quite difficult to 
establish.  In some states, such as Minnesota,  the politics of regulation  were 
closely balanced, and each session of the legislature reversed or substantially 
limited the work of the previous session.’ In states where regulation  was over- 
whelmingly  popular,  such as Illinois.  its proponents  faced a serious judicial 
obstacle in that opponents successfully challenged the constitutionality of reg- 
ulatory statutes. 
Before the Mimi  decision the core argument against state economic regula- 
tion was that it violated state and federal constitutional provisions protecting 
the sanctity of contracts.” The basis for this argument was the Supreme Court’s 
Dcirtrizoutli College decision in I8 19. which ruled that a corporate charter was 
a contract between a state and ri  corporation. “the obligations of which cannot 
be  impaired,  without  violating the  constitution  of  the United  States.”’ This 
decision  was derived  from  article  I  ~  section  10, of the federal  Constitution, 
which  prohibits  states from passins a “law impairing the obligation  of con- 
tract.” The Dart/nout/i dccision prevented  states from passing legislation  that 
altered a corporate charter or a prior  act establishing  mutual obligations be- 
tween a state and a corporation. 
In the case of railroads, corporate charters and other licenses granting rights 
of way specified the terms under which railroads would provide service. Dur- 
ing the  1850s Congress passed several statutes authorizing states to give fed- 
eral land to railroads as an incentive to construct  new routes? States imple- 
mented these acts by  conducting competitive bids and negotiations, typically 
including  specifics about service and prices.  In  most  cases the terms of  the 
agreement  were  then  adopted  in  legislation,  while  in  other  cases  the 
agreements  were concluded by  a state government official operating under a 
general  statute  governing  these  arrangements.  In both  cases, the  courts re- 
garded an  agreement between  a railroad and a state as a contract. Except in 
unusual  circumstances,  a state could not unilaterally  alter this agreement by 
passing new laws. 
In Dartmoiith and subsequent decisions, the courts recognized one mecha- 
5. For a detailed history of regulation in Minnewta, see Larson 1926. 
6. For a complete discusion of Supreine Court decision\ about state regulation during the nine- 
7. Dar~rnoirth  Collc,ye I:  Wootl~t~rrd,  3 Wheat. 5 I8 ( I8  I9  1,  650. 
8. The federal government  LIIW  chartered  wme railroads and granted thein rights of way  and 
other subsidies, beginning with the Union Pacific in 1862. The purpose of the% railroads was to 
extend senice :icros\  the western territories tu the Pacitic coast. Because the inlerveniiig areas 
were jparsely wttlcd and conlained lew cumiiiunitics that wcrc attractive terminal sites, the federal 
gweriiinenr could not realislically delegate responsibility for route selection and subsidization to 
them. For extensive discu\sions of  the history of transcontinentnl railroads. see Aims 1969. Hunt 
1958, and Trottinnn 1923. 
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nism by which a state could unilaterally change an agreement with a corpora- 
tion. If either corporate charters or the state constitution contained a provision 
that explicitly reserved the power to revise a charter, the courts permitted laws 
that changed the terms of the initial agreement. Before the Civil War several 
states called  constitutional  conventions to consider,  among other things,  in- 
serting a “reservation clause’’ into their state constitutions.  For example, the 
Iowa Constitutional  Convention of  1857 adopted  a provision  by  which  “the 
General  Assembly  shall  have  the  power  to  amend  or  repeal  all  laws  for 
the organization or creation of corporations, or granting of special or exclusive 
privileges or immunities, by  a vote of  two-thirds of each branch  of the Gen- 
eral Assembly.”” 
Although a reservation clause or a provision  that established  the constitu- 
tional  power  of  the  state to regulate corporations was  sufficient to pass  the 
Dartmouth test, the constitutionality issue was not fully settled until the 1890s. 
In Murin v.  Illirzois and other contemporary challenges to state regulation, com- 
panies contended that states violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal 
Constitution. Passed in 1867, section  1  of the Fourteenth Amendment prohib- 
ited states from depriving “any person of  life, liberty or property without due 
process of law.” The significance of the Fourteenth Amendment is that, before 
its passage, most of  the rights defined  in the Constitution  were regarded  as 
limiting  actions  by  the  federal  government,  but  were  not  regarded  as  con- 
straining actions by states. In Mum,  the court ruled that restrictions on use of 
property “clothed with a public interest” were not prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and so could be regulated by state statutes, as monopolistic abuse 
had been controlled for centuries through common law litigation.“’ 
Simultaneously with Murin, the Supreme Court issued several short rulings 
dealing with state laws regulating railroads.”  These cases were actually more 
important, for they implicitly  overturned an important  aspect of Durtmouth. 
Prior to these decisions, railroads that were chartered before the adoption of  a 
reservation clause could not  be regulated.’’ In  the Granger railroad cases, the 
Court asserted that state railroad regulation was acceptable unless the railroad’s 
charter specifically exempted it, and then found that the charters contained no 
such exemptions. This line of argument effectively reversed the precedent that 
states must reserve the right to change charters before the charters were issued 
or live with them forever (Kitch and Bowler 1979, 342-43). 
9. Article  7. section  12. Constitution  of  the  State of  Iowa  (Iowa Constitutional Convention 
10. Majority opinion by Justice WJite. Mirrrri  I:  Illirzois, 126. 
1 I. The Granger railroad case\ that were decided in  1877 with Miwi  wcrc Chictigo Burlirijitori 
cirid  Quirq  Railrorid  v.  Imvo, 94 L.S. 155; Prik  1’.  Chicugo mid Norrhw.rstern Railmud, 94 US. 
164; Chicrigo, Milwtiukrr, nrxl  SI.  f’rrul  Roilrocid  I,.  Ackley, 94 U.S.  179: Wirioricr arid St. Peter 
Rriilrorid  L,.  Blake. 94 U.S. 180; and Smnc,  1,.  Wisc.ori.vin, 94 U.S. 18  I. 
12. The issue first arose when Ohio revised its constitution in I848 to prohibit corporate charters 
from containing exemptions from taxation. and then imposed taxes on corporations that wcrc char- 
tered  under the old constitution. The court declared these taxez to he unconstitutional 
to the contract clause in Piquci Br-mch ofthe  Stcite Bririk ofOliio i! K~~OO~J,  57 US. 369 ( 1850). 
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Munn and the associated railroad cases did not settle the constitutional issue. 
In 1886 Justice Harlan, in dissenting from a decision concerning state railroad 
regulation, reiterated the standard argument against ex post regulatory statutes: 
Does anyone believe that private capitalists would have supplied the money 
necessary to establish and maintain these lines of inter-state communication 
had they supposed that the States . . . reserved the right, by commissioners, 
to take charge of the whole matter of rates and abrogate, at their pleasure, 
such tariffs or charges as might be established by the companies under the 
power expressly conferred of fixing and regulating  rate^?'^ 
Although a minority  position in this case, the decision to gut  state railroad 
regulation commanded a majority  in October 1886, when the Supreme Court 
decided in Wabash,  St. Louis, and Pacific Railway Co.  v.  Illinois that Illinois 
could  not regulate  prices for any portion  of  an interstate  shipment  because 
to do so violated the constitutional prohibition against state interference with 
interstate commerce.14  This decision effectively prevented states from correct- 
ing the long-haul, short-haul price differential on their own, and provided addi- 
tional political  impetus for the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act a few 
months later.IS 
The significance of  the legal history of state regulation is that for approxi- 
mately fifteen years, states could-and  some did-engage  in extensive eco- 
nomic regulation of  railroads. After 1886, state regulation continued, but only 
at the sufferance of  the federal government. Commencing with the Wabash 
decision and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, states continued to regulate 
aspects of the intrastate components of  interstate commerce, but only when 
they were granted the authority to do so by federal statute. 
1.3  The Political History of the Granger Acts 
The core economic issues associated with the creation of railroad regulation 
have been much studied and are not in dispute. Beginning in the 184Os, spurred 
by federal land grants and subsidies from state and local governments, the rail- 
roads  rapidly  expanded their  route  structure  in  the  vast,  agriculturally  rich 
13. Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust, 116 U.S. 337 (1886). 
14. Wabash,  Sf.  Louis, and Puc&  Railway Co. v. Illinois, I18 U.S. 557 (1886). 
15. For discussions of the importance of the  Wabash decision in the passage of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, see Fiorina 1986 and Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast 1990; for a contrary view, 
see Poole and Rosenthal, chap. 3 of this volume. Regardless of the causal role of  Wabash  in the 
passage of  the Interstate Commerce Act, the  fact remains that  the act  contained  a clause  that 
overturned  Wabash in  part by  reestablishing the power of  states to regulate railroad prices for 
intrastate shipments. This provision of the act subsequently was incorporated almost verbatim in 
subsequent statutes that established federal economic regulation of trucking, water transportation, 
airlines, pipelines, natural gas extraction, electricity transmission, telecommunications, and most 
recently (1  992) basic cable television service. Thus, the long-run effect of  Wabash  was to transfer 
to the federal government the responsibility to regulate the intrastate portions of interstate transac- 
tions in infrastructural industries. 19  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of  1870 
lands between the Appalachian and Rocky Mountains. The new transportation 
network facilitated the development of grain farming by proving a cheap, reli- 
able and fast means for transporting grain to major eastern ports for transship- 
ment to Europe. Relatively early in the history of railroad development, grain 
shipment between major midwestern cities and American  seaports was com- 
petitive, in part because  several railroads connected major eastern  and mid- 
western cities, and in part because barges using the Great Lakes and the Mis- 
sissippi  River  system  provided  a  feasible  alternative  to  rails  when  the 
waterways were open. But grain shipment from rural  areas to transportation 
centers usually was not competitive. Most rural communities did not have ac- 
cess to water transportation and were served by only a single railroad. Out of 
this circumstance arose the “long-haul, short-haul’’ rate controversy. 
Residents  of  rural  communities complained that  railroads  set excessively 
high prices for the relatively  short shipping distances between  a rural depot 
and the nearest major transportation hub. In theory, if railroads enjoyed secure 
monopolies in rural communities along their rights of  way, they could engage 
in price discrimination  to  extract the economic rent of  agricultural  land. In 
practice  some railroad monopolies were more secure than others, depending 
on the proximity of a rural community to a navigable waterway, which might 
be reachable by  wagons over toll roads, or another railroad, which might be 
induced to add a spur from its nearest track. In any case contemporary accounts 
and  subsequent historical  research  confirm  that  most  rural  shippers faced 
higher  prices  for short-haul  shipments than for competitive  long-haul  ship- 
ments. The traditional historical view of the rise of railroad regulation is that 
rural shippers organized a political movement to demand action against rail- 
road monopolies.Ih 
The origins of a political demand for regulation lay in the process by which 
the railroads initially obtained  corporate charters and rights of  way. Assem- 
bling rights of  way privately  was slow and expensive, requiring  negotiations 
with numerous landowners plus communities that might serve as terminals. A 
quicker, cheaper method was for the state to assemble land for the railroads, 
combining public lands with private lands that were taken through  condem- 
nation. 
Because the development of  the American hinterland depended on the pro- 
vision of reliable and inexpensive transportation of primary products to eastern 
cities, the public sector enthusiastically accepted the responsibility to assemble 
railroad rights of way. To facilitate settlement of the lands west of the Appala- 
chians, the federal government began giving public lands to railroad compa- 
nies. The procedure for making land grants to the railroads was a series of laws 
that gave states the authority to select the rights of way to be given to railroads 
through  designated federal  lands.  Typically  states  implemented the federal 
land grant laws by inviting the railroads to make route proposals to the state. 
16. See, for example, Buck 1913. 1920; Larson  1926; Goldstein 1928; and Miller 1971 20  Mark T. Kanazawa and Roger G. Noll 
Because the economically feasible number of railroad routes and terminals 
was too small to make every community a railroad terminal, localities began 
to compete for selection as a terminal by  offering subsidies to a railroad that 
would pass through them. This process gave rise to several major political is- 
sues. First, because the winning subsidy bids were necessarily based on expec- 
tations about the growth of  a community after the railroad began operation, 
some communities bid more than they ultimately could afford, and some rail- 
roads  were  built  before  they  were  economically  viable.”  Second, because 
routes and land grants were ultimately selected by state legislatures. corruption 
scandals developed over the selection of routes and the railroad companies that 
were granted franchises. Third. once a railroad was constructed, public con- 
cern shifted to monopolistic practices by the railroad. 
In response to these issues, in the  1850s states began to establish rules and 
procedures governing  railroad construction  and operation. States passed laws 
and amendments to state constitutions that placed limits on the indebtedness 
of local governments and the subsidies that they could give to a railroad. States 
also wrote into laws that awarded land grants to railroads specific requirements 
regarding tariffs. services, and the rate of progress to complete the route. And, 
to make route awards inore rational  and less susceptible to corruption, states 
established  bureaucracies  to oversee the entire process. One of the early ex- 
aniples is the Michigan Board of Control, established in 1857 to irnplcment an 
I856 federal land grant act for the state. The board, composed of the governor 
and six appointed commissioners, was not a regulatory agency, for its purpose 
was to negotiate the terms of land grants (Michigan State Legislature  1857): 
however, its structure and procedures were clear precursors of economic regu- 
latory bodies. 
The price ceilings in charters and land-grant agreements soon proved to be 
ineffective. Real  shipping  costs fell  during  the  1860s due to technological 
progress  in railroad technology, rapid  growth  in shipments that allowed rail- 
roads to capture scale economies, and the federal deflationary policy after the 
Civil  War arising  from repayment  of  government  war debts.Ix Hence, price 
ceilings adopted in the  1850s became increasingly generous as nominal costs 
fell.  Competition  forced  railroads  to  set  rates  below  the  ceiling  for  long- 
distance  shipments,  but  railroads  would  not  voluntarily  reduce  short-haul 
tariffs unless the ceiling exceeded the monopoly price. 
The final event  encouraging  the Granger movement  was  a change in the 
jurisdiction  of the courts. Before the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 
1890, many  monopolistic  practices,  including  price  discrimination,  were 
grounds for civil claims under common  law.  Consequently, shippers in rural 
17. See Rutten n.d., 17-20.  for a description of several Supreme Court decision\ that arose when 
state and local governments attempted to back out of \ub\idy agreements with railroads after the 
benefits from the railroad boom of the  1850s proved to be less than anticipated. Sce Fogel  1960 
lor an analysis of  thc constt-uction and  early operation  of  the  Union  Pacitic.  an  example of  a 
railroad that was probably built earlier than was economically justitied. 
18. For a detailed study of  the history of rail shipping costs. hee Lebergott  1966. 21  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of 1870 
areas  could  sue railroads  for a short-haul.  long-haul  price  differential  that 
could not be justified on the basis of cost. Typically these cases were litigated 
in state courts, usually  in the courthouse of the county  in which  the plaintiff 
resided. Beginning in 1863, a series of Supreme Court decisions and acts of 
Congress transferred jurisdiction over almost all private litigation against rail- 
roads from state to federal courts. Removal  of  jurisdiction to federal  courts 
disadvantaged rural communities because federal cases were normally tried in 
the federal court in the state capital, which was usually much farther away than 
the county seat and was less likely to have a sympathetic  judge and jury.’” 
By  the late  1850s farmer discontent  with  railroad practices began  to have 
important political consequences. For example, in I857 Iowa called a constitu- 
tional convention to deal with problems of railroad charters and local govern- 
ment subsidies of railroads, and in I862 a constitutional convention was held 
in Illinois in which railroads were a main topic of debate.?”  After the Civil War 
several vigorous farmer activist organizations became important in midwestern 
and southern politics.”  Foremost among them was the Patrons of Husbandry, 
more popularly known as the Grangers. Initially a social and educational  or- 
ganization, the Grangers quickly extended their activities to include political 
advocacy of farmer interests. In the late  1860s the Grangers grew to political 
importance  in many  states, but  especially  in Illinois,  Iowa,  Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin.?? One issue taken up by  the Grangers was the farmers’ discontent 
with railroad monopolies. 
After several failed attempts, in 1873 and  1874 legislation regulating rail- 
roads and grain warehouses passed in all four of the Granger states. Typically 
these laws set ceilings on tariffs for passenger and freight transportation, lim- 
ited the extent of  price  discrimination,  and established  prices,  storage  stan- 
dards, and inspection systems for grain warehouses. 
The railroads led the fight against these laws. In legal challenges to the con- 
stitutionality of regulation. as well as political arguments against their passage 
and later in support of their repeal, the railroads argued that regulation expro- 
priated their capital investments.”  Consequently, argued the railroads, regula- 
tion was not only an unfair (and unconstitutional) taking of property, but would 
also stop expansion of the railroad system, and hence the development of  the 
19. See Kutler  1968, Merkel 1‘184, and Wiccek  1969 for  ounts of the expanded jurisdiction 
of thc federal courts after the Civil War. Although state juri5diction over railroad cases was not 
completely removed until the Judiciary Act of  1875. by  the early  1870s enough jurisdiction  had 
heen  removed to scvercly limit thc effectiveness of  state courts in resolving  disputes between 
shippers and railroads. 
20. For details about the  1861 convention. see Cornelius 1972. chap. 3. 
21. The classic history of the Grangcrs and other agrarian reform movements is the two-volume 
sequence by Buck (1913. 1920). 
22. In a survey of  several  important histories of the era. McGuire  (1981) concludes that  the 
Granger movement was most activc and powerful in the$e four statcs. See also Buck 19 13, chap. 
2. and Miller I97  1. 
23. For an extensive compendium of public statements for and against the Granger laws, see 
Detrick  1903, 238-47. 22  Mark T.  Kanazawa and Roger G. No11 
West.24  Many years  later a sequence of Supreme Court decisions, beginning 
with Smyth v. Ames in  1898, established  that regulated  prices must be suffi- 
ciently high to enable regulated firms to earn a competitive return on reason- 
able capital investments, so that the claims of the railroads now would be over- 
blown. But in the nineteenth century, before the Court established ground rules 
for economic regulation, a reasonable person could have been uncertain about 
the effects of economic regulation, and concluded that these claims were plau- 
sible. Hence, citizens with no love lost for railroads might have been concerned 
that  regulation  would  halt  railroad  construction  and  thereby  retard  national 
economic development. Moreover, even a farmer in an area not served by the 
railroads would have preferred monopoly service to no service at all, because 
even the most rapacious railroad was unlikely to possess the information and 
market power necessary to extract all of  the rents from local agriculture. 
The case made by the railroads was influential in many areas. In some states, 
regulatory legislation was weak, and in others strong legislation was soon re- 
pealed or emasculated. Even in three of the four Granger states, railroad regu- 
lation was repealed  or emasculated by  the late 1870s. For example, in  1874 
Minnesota enacted a tough statute that created a Railroad Board of Commis- 
sioners to  set maximum  rates  (Minnesota  State Legislature  1874, chap. 26, 
140-50). A year later, rate-making authority was replaced by a general prohibi- 
tion against price discrimination and “an unreasonable price for the transporta- 
tion of persons or property,” and the Board of Commissioners was replaced by 
a single railroad commissioner whose duties were only to examine the books 
of railroads and to report to the governor whether the act was being honored 
(Minnesota  State Legislature  1875, chap. 103, 135-38).  Enforcement of the 
pricing rules was left to private litigation by aggrieved parties, with triple dam- 
ages against a railroad found to violate them. The effect of this statute was to 
return to state courts the authority to police monopolistic abuses; however, the 
1875 act also served to eliminate economic regulation of the railroads. Like- 
wise, in Wisconsin one of the strongest Granger statutes, the Potter Act, was 
passed in 1874 but repealed in 1876 (Detrick 1903). This pattern of legislative 
rise and fall corresponds quite closely to the rise and fall in Granger member- 
ship (table 1.1). 
In Illinois the Granger laws proved to be more durable, and eventually be- 
came examples for several states west of the Mississippi. Illinois regulation 
continued to be challenged by  the railroads, and periodically  returned to the 
Supreme Court for further  scrutiny. Finally,  in  Wubash (yet another Illinois 
case) and the Interstate Commerce Act, state Granger laws were permanently 
circumscribed through federalization of regulatory authority for the short-haul 
component of interstate shipments. Nevertheless, the federal law paralleled the 
Granger statutes in that it limited long-haul,  short-haul rate differentials  and 
established the ICC to control rates. Moreover, the Interstate Commerce Act 
became  the blueprint  for subsequent federal regulatory  statutes, such as the 
24. For the economic argument on takings without compensation, see Michelman 1967. 23  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of  1870 
Table 1.1  Grange Membership in the Granger States 
Granges per 100,000 Agricultural Population 
Year  Illinois  Minnesota  Iowa  Wisconsin 
May  1873  109  238  63 1  * 82 
March 1874  284  478  775  235 
September 1874  376  540  806  289 
January 1875  377  490  735  284 
October 1875  I94  44  1  452  25 I 
July 1876  157  27 1  382  I62 
Source; Buck  1913,58-59 
Federal  Power  Act,  the  Communications  Act,  and  the  Civil  Aviation  Act. 
Hence, the origins and effects of  the Granger laws-and  the Illinois law, in 
particular-can  legitimately be characterized as the first important stage of the 
American experience with economic regulation. 
1.4  The Economic Theory of Regulation and the Granger Laws 
The economic theory of politics provides a conceptual model for explaining 
the origins of economic regulation. This theory emphasizes the ability of orga- 
nized  interests to influence  public  policy  to their advantage.25 Interests  are 
more likely to become organized, and if  organized  more influential, if  they 
have higher per capita stakes in an issue, more homogeneous interests among 
group members, and, ceteris paribus, more members. In regulatory policy, reg- 
ulated industries are advantaged in that they have a common interest in cartel- 
ization and, because many fewer people work in an industry than pay for its 
products,  much  higher per capita stakes in regulation  than  their customers. 
Regulated firms are disadvantaged only by numbers, although even this may 
not be true if most of their customers are not citizens of the jurisdiction impos- 
ing regulation. In the battle over state regulation, railroads certainly were well- 
organized, but they could have suffered because  some of their stockholders 
and employees were residents of  other states, whereas all intrastate shippers, 
by definition, were citizens of the state imposing regulation. 
The total economic stake of a group in a policy issue is related to the amount 
of support that it can gain for its preferred policies. Greater  stakes increase 
the resources available to the group for influencing  government officials, for 
informing members and other citizens about an issue, and for inducing citizens 
to vote as the interest group prefers. Hence, support for a policy as measured 
by votes in either a popular election or a legislature should be positively corre- 
lated with the magnitude of a group’s stake in the outcome of an election. 
Much of the research that develops and tests the economic theory of regula- 
25.  See Becker  1983; Peltzman  1976, 1989; and Stigler  1971. For a survey of  the research 
literature on the economic theory of the politics of regulation, see Noll 1989. 24  Mark T.  Kanazawa and Roger G. Noll 
tion focuses on the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of  1887 and the 
subsequent federal regulation of railroads.’” From this research, three compet- 
ing accounts of the origins of railroad regulation emerge. 
The traditional  historical  view of  regulation, sometimes called the “public 
interest” or normative theory, held that railroad regulation arose to  protect ship- 
pers, especially farmers, from monopolistic abuses. According to this account, 
regulation  sought to force railroads to charge more competitive prices in mo- 
nopolized, primarily  short-haul, markets.  In the framework of  the economic 
theory of politics, the winning interest in the battle over railroad regulation was 
rural industry, primarily agriculture. Farmer activist organizations such as the 
Grangers  were  the  interest  groups that  sought  regulation  and  controlled  its 
character. 
The revisionist view, emphasized  by  the early research  applying  the eco- 
nomic theory of  regulation, argued that regulation benefited railroads because 
it helped them organize more effective regional cartels to prevent competition 
in long-haul shipping. To revisionists the long-haul, short-haul rate differential 
was reduced by  setting monopoly prices in structurally competitive long-haul 
routes. rather than by cutting monopoly prices in short-haul markets. Thus, the 
winning organized interest was the railroad industry. 
More recent research has produced a third view. According to this account. 
the coalition that benefited from railroad regulation included some (but not all) 
shippers and railroads. Farmers, through activist organizations, received some 
relief from price discrimination, but the large regional railroads that competed 
in long-haul markets also received relief from intermittent  competitive price 
wars that more than offset the loss of profits in monopoly routes. The losers 
were small railroads with little or no long-haul traffic, and shippers of products 
in competitive  long-haul markets  (especially manufacturers). Thus, on each 
side of the market, the better organized and more powerful interests succeeded 
at the expense of less powerful, less well organized interests. 
Although  the third  view is not applicable  to the rise of  state regulation,  it 
nevertheless provides an important insight that we will exploit in developing 
our model. The useful  insight in the third  model  is that the relevant  unit of 
analysis for understanding  the politics of regulation  is not necessarily either 
railroads or shippers as coherent  groups, but  subsets of each. The particular 
version of  this approach that has been used to study the origins of the ICC is 
not applicable to state regulation because  states could not  control  long-haul 
shipping rates, and therefore could not help long-haul railroads  stabilize re- 
gional rate-making cartels. The only ways that state regulation could benefit 
railroads would  be  to prevent  price  competition  in areas served by  multiple 
railroads and entry in areas served by  a monopoly. All railroads would share 
76. See Gilligan, Marqhall, and Weinfast  1989; MacAvoy  1965; Porter 1983: Spann and Erick- 
son 1970: Ulen 1982; and Zcrbc 1980. 25  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of  1870 
in this benefit, and all would suffer if regulation imposed lower prices in mo- 
nopolized areas. 
Among shippers, the effects of regulation could have been quite different, 
depending on the extent of railroad development in the community. The extent 
of competition in a local railroad market affects price and service, so that com- 
munities experiencing different levels of  competition  could face different ex- 
pected gains or losses from regulation  (depending on whether regulation fa- 
vored shippers or railroads). In addition, regulation can affect the likelihood 
of future railroad entry and, consequently, the amount of competition a com- 
munity is likely to enjoy in the future. Thus, to understand the source of diver- 
sity among shippers requires  understanding the dynamics of railroad market 
structure and investment in new lines, which is examined in section  1.4.1. 
A fourth view, emphasized  in the debates about railroad regulation  in the 
middle of the nineteenth century but largely ignored in academic research, is 
that the purpose of regulation was to expropriate railroad capital. Like the pub- 
lic interest theory, this account can be interpreted  as a victory for organized 
farmer interests, but in this case the gains to the victors were not limited to the 
elimination of monopoly profits. 
A fifth hypothesis is that members of economic interest groups more or less 
uniformly supported policies beneficial to most but not necessarily all of them. 
In principle, universal support for regulation among all shippers could be part 
of a logroll in which shippers who were not benefited by  regulation received 
support on some other issue from their colleagues who favored regulation. In 
this case this explanation  is insufficient, because in the ratification election 
citizens  were  allowed  to  vote  on  each  constitutional  measure  separately, 
thereby allowing them to vote only for those elements of the logroll package 
that were in their interest. Thus, uniform shipper support despite divergence of 
interests among them requires altruistic behavior by some shippers. Although 
not usually associated with an economic theory of politics, this view has found 
general theoretical expression in Harsanyi’s (1969) theory of “low cost objec- 
tivity.” Harsanyi posits that citizens will behave altruistically if doing so is not 
very costly. Although Harsanyi’s theory is too nonspecific for ascertaining its 
meaning in this case, a reasonable application of this idea is that rural shippers 
stuck together to rid some of their members of monopoly abuses by railroads, 
even if others had no stake in the issue or even actually suffered a small loss. 
1.4.1  The Economics of  Railroad Entry 
As  described  above,  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century  railroads  were  con- 
structed through a two-stage competitive bidding process. Communities com- 
peted to be included  in  railroad route proposals,  and railroads competed to 
obtain state approval of route proposals in order to receive land grants for rights 
of way. This process took place in an economic environment in which the de- 
mand for rail service was growing rapidly, fueled by  the large world demand 26  Mark T. Kanazawa and Roger G. No11 
for American primary products and by population  growth in the areas along 
lines of rail.  Because  several railroads were rapidly extending service in the 
Midwest, the equilibrium in the bidding process would have had two interest- 
ing properties. 
The first characteristic of the bidding equilibrium is that railroads will enter 
a local market at the moment when the discounted present value of the future 
stream of  railroad profits,  including any subsidies, is sufficient to produce a 
competitive return on investment over its entire useful life-which,  for a rail- 
road line, is a very long time. Obviously, the railroad would prefer to wait to 
enter until revenues in the entry period are sufficient to produce a competitive 
return  on its capital investments. Competition for the market,  however, will 
force railroads to enter sooner than this. Because the first entrant receives sub- 
sidies and expects a period  of  monopoly  profits  before  a second entrant is 
viable, competition among railroads will produce entry before the entrant can 
earn a competitive single-period  return on its investment. Indeed, even if no 
subsidy  is available, railroads  enter when, in discounted  present  value, the 
losses from early operations are exactly offset by the excess profits in the mo- 
nopoly period. Eventually, as demand continues to grow, a second railroad will 
enter when its subsidy plus the discounted present value of future profits ex- 
ceeds zero. As before, if at some point duopoly profits are positive but insuffi- 
cient to induce immediate entry by  a third railroad, the second railroad will 
enter before its first-period profits are nonnegative, and earlier still if it is of- 
fered a subsidy. 
The second interesting feature of the bidding equilibrium is that a commu- 
nity is likely to provide a subsidy even though a railroad would enter in any 
case before it could begin to earn a competitive return. The rationality of sub- 
sidies derives from the economies of scale in railroads. Suppose that the rail- 
road has a cost function of the form 
(1)  C(q)  = F + rnq, 
where q is the annual quantity of shipments, F  is the fixed cost of track and 
terminal facilities, and rn is the long-run marginal cost of a shipment, including 
only capital costs that are sensitive to shipping volume at the margin. This cost 
function is not realistic for all ranges of railroad output. At some point, the 
size of the market becomes large enough so that a railroad line suffers conges- 
tion costs, and eventually  multiple railroads  become  economically efficient; 
however, initially railroads are economically beneficial and profitable long be- 
fore a rail line is fully utilized, so that the production function exhibits signifi- 
cant economies of scale.27 
Even  in  multifirm  railroad  markets,  each  firm  may  have  exploited scale 
economies. In  the  era of  initial railroad  entry, a community would  have  an 
incentive to induce competitive entry long before the first entrant was no longer 
27. For evidence on this point, see Lebergott 1966 and Fogel  1979 27  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of  1870 
a natural  monopolist.  In  particular, the community wants  a second railroad 
when the gain in surplus from price competition  offsets the fixed cost of in- 
vestment. 
Suppose that for a given market demand and subsidy a railroad has decided 
to enter at a given time. To induce the railroad to enter one year earlier, the 
revenues for the additional year must cover that year’s operating costs, mq, plus 
one year’s opportunity  cost of capital,  rE  where r is the competitive  rate of 
return. That is, the additional first-year subsidy, S, and the tariff on shipments, 
R must satisfy 
(2)  S + Pq 2 rF + mq. 
Because the railroad prefers not to enter, the profit-maximizing  price for the 
first (subsidized) year must be less than average cost. Thus, from (2) the mini- 
mum subsidy to induce entry, S, is 
(3)  -  S = rF -  (P -  m)q. 
The benefit  to the community from inducing  the railroad  to enter one year 
earlier is the consumers’ surplus from q units of shipments at price l?**  Let W 
equal the maximum total willingness to pay for q units of shipment per year. 
The community should be willing to induce entry one year earlier as long as 
(4) 
The necessary conditions for (4) to be satisfied are that demand be positive and 
less than perfectly elastic at P = m. The sufficient condition is that there exists 
a nonlinear tariff  schedule that, if enforceable, could recover the one-period 
opportunity  cost of capital, even though the profit-maximizing  constant unit 
price could not. In equilibrium, entry will occur in the first year in which the 
consumers’ surplus available from operations exceeds the amount of capital 
costs that are not recovered from tariffs. 
The partial-equilibrium,  surplus-maximizing agreement would  be for the 
railroad  to set P  = m,  and for the community to pay S = F (or to pay  rF 
annually j. This solution was  also plausibly  the optimal solution  in  general 
equilibrium, for in a nineteenth-century  rural community the tax base for rai- 
sing the subsidy was almost exclusively  a property tax in which virtually  all 
value was in land, making the tax nondistortionary. In principle, the initial sub- 
sidy agreement could specify P  = m;  however, because the future nominal 
w  -  Pq 2 5. 
28. The analysis here closely parallels the “social savings” analysis that economic historians 
have pursued in calculating the economic benefits of railroad investment, as summarized nicely in 
Fogel 1979, and the analysis of the economic costs of transportation regulation, as summarized in 
Braeutigam and No11 1984. Assuming no transactions costs or inefficiencies in the implementation 
of  policy, the willingness to pay  subsidies by  local, state, and federal governments equals the 
economic historians’ social savings of the railroads minus the excess profits of railroad companies. 
Likewise, the willingness to pay for inducing early railroad entry though subsidies is calculated in 
the same way  that, one hundred years later, economists  measured the benefits of  deregulation, 
except once again the latter includes, but the former excludes, the excess profits of railroads. 28  Mark T. Kanazawa and Roger G. Noll 
value of marginal cost is uncertain, a permanent price specified in a long-term 
contract is almost certain not to equal marginal cost. Hence, “public interest” 
regulation, which measures costs and resets prices as new information  is re- 
ceived, is conceptually attractive and easy to characterize:  set P = tn in each 
period, and allow investment subsidies through competitive bidding. 
Of course, if regulation can legally expropriate capital, railroads may oppose 
the public interest regulatory agreement out of fear that, once the subsidy has 
been paid and the railroad has invested, the government will engage in ex post 
opportunism by  setting prices below long-run marginal cost. If regulators can- 
not  credibly  commit  to  implement  regulation  according  to  this  ex  ante 
agreement, railroads will be reluctant to agree to the most efficient combina- 
tion of  subsidies and prices. Instead, railroads are likely to prefer the process 
that  actually  emerged, in which  competition  for the market established  the 
subsidy and subsequent  prices were controlled  by  a fixed price ceiling. The 
Dartmouth precedent is an important component of  this agreement, of  course, 
because  it assures the railroads that the state will not be able to take ex post 
advantage of the railroad by  unilaterally altering rates. Not until Smyth v.  Anzrs 
in 1898 did a railroad have the legal protection that would have given it comfort 
in reaching  this kind  of agreement. In  any  case, reversal  of  the Darrmouth 
precedent to allow price-reducing  regulation after the fact was expropriative, 
for in competing for the market. the winning bid from a railroad generates only 
competitive expected returns over the life of the railroad’s initial investment. 
A parallel analysis applies to the circumstance in which a community may 
be able to reach a mutually beneficial agreement to induce the entry of a second 
firm to break a profitable monopoly. Here the benefit to the community is the 
gain in surplus arising from more competition. Let P(n)  and q(n)  represent the 
equilibrium price and shipments in an n-firm market. Assuming that all firms 
have the cost function represented in equation (1) and share the market equally, 
then, analogously to (3),  a railroad  can be induced to be the next entrant one 
year early if its subsidy satisfies 
(5)  S 2 rF -  [P(n  + 1) -  m]q(n  + l)/(n + 1) 
Analogously to (4), the community will find this worthwhile if the increase in 
consumers’ surplus offsets the subsidy. Assuming linear demand, this occurs if 
Given the assumption about the cost function, the first railroad can offer the 
community a better agreement by  promising to lower its price slightly below 
the duopoly price and satisfy all demand. This agreement avoids the fixed cost 
of  the  second railroad,  creating  the possibility  for a mutually  advantageous 
agreement between the first railroad and the community. Again, the agreement 
could take the form of regulation in which price contains a markup over non- 
subsidized  average costs that  makes shippers at least as well  off as if  there 
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be able credibly  to commit to implement  this pricing  agreement and not to 
expropriate railroad capital ex post. 
1.4.2  Railroad Dynamics and Shipper Stakes in Regulation 
The interests  of  shippers under each of  the theories  of  regulation  can be 
categorizcd according to their access to railroad service. In particular, the pre- 
ceding analysis can be used to cxamine the effects of different forms of regula- 
tion-cartelization,  public interest, and expropriation-on  the entry dynamics 
as well as the short-term price of  service in different types of  communities, 
and hence how rational voters in these communities should react to a proposal 
to regulate the railroads. 
Unsrnied Communities 
In communities lacking reliable transportation, whether by rail or water, the 
primary concern about regulation  would be its effect on entry. Before railroad 
entry these communities had to resort to using wagons over trails and roads, 
which, in the nineteenth century, were of  low quality and poorly maintained. 
The primary concern of these communities would be to obtain service, even at 
monopoly prices. Typically thcse communities offered subsidies to railroads 
to induce them to provide service. 
If regulation cartelizes the industry, a community without service can expect 
never to benefit from price competition, even if entry occurs. In this case the 
first railroad can expect monopoly profits to persist long after a second railroad 
would have entered had regulation not been imposed. If cartelizing regulation 
is adopted, competition  for the market  will  cause the  first railroad  to  enter 
earlier and/or with a lower subsidy. Thus, the desirability of regulation  to the 
local community depends on whether earlier entry with lower subsidies offsets 
the higher  prices of  sustained  monopoly.  If  the community and the railroad 
face the same opportunity cost of capital, the community should oppose regu- 
lation.”  The reduction in subsidy that exactly offsets the railroad’s increased 
future  monopoly  profits  must be  too  small to offset  the discounted present 
value of  the costs of monopoly to the community, because  only the latter in- 
cludes the deadweight loss of monopoly. 
Thc analysis of  the effect  of  regulation on an unserved community when 
regulation prevents monopoly pricing is the mirror image of the previous case. 
If the first railroad’s profits in the monopoly period are reduced, a railroad will 
enter later and/or require a larger subsidy. If railroads and the community use 
the  same discount  rate, and if the higher subsidy under regulation  leaves an 
2Y. For two reasons the tinancinl cti\t of capital was probably not  the saine for railroads and 
communities. First, railroads operated in intcrnalional capital markets. while many local govern- 
ments were confined to participation  in regional  markets. giving the r;tilroads ail advantage. But 
thc courts had ruled that state and local debt. too. wilq a contract and so  could not constitutionally 
he abrogated. reducing its ri\k to lenders. Becauac thcw factors work in the opposite directions. 
we see no a priori reason to aswine anything other than that the cost of  capital was approximately 
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entering railroad indifferent about whether regulation is imposed, the commu- 
nity is better off because it avoids the deadweight loss of monopoly. 
If regulation expropriates railroad capital, railroads will not enter unless the 
initial subsidy is large enough to offset the subsequent expropriation. Assum- 
ing that long-run marginal costs include some capital cost, unserved communi- 
ties will oppose this form of regulation.30  The reason is that the incremental 
benefit to shippers from prices below long-run marginal costs is always smaller 
than the incremental cost incurred in providing service at these prices. Hence, 
the increased subsidy required by the railroad will always exceed the present 
value of future prices below marginal cost. 
Monopolized Communities 
Although a monopolized community is better off than an unserved locality, 
it still prefers to reduce the market power of its railroad.  The two available 
means for reducing railroad tariffs are to regulate rates or to induce additional 
railroads to enter the market. The latter could occur if a nearby rail line could 
be extended to the community, which presumably  would happen if either the 
duopolistic price exceeded the competitive equilibrium or the community of- 
fered a large enough subsidy to induce entry that would not otherwise occur. 
The regulatory alternative would be preferred by this community if it led to a 
lower price than the duopoly price plus the amortized unit cost of the subsidy 
to induce a second entrant. 
If regulation cartelizes railroad services, monopolized  communities would 
be unambiguously worse off, for regulation would not lower current prices and 
would eliminate the price effects of  future entry. The latter effect  would  be 
offset in part by a lower subsidy to induce the second entrant, assuming that 
entry would  still occur under cartelization; however,  because of  the greater 
deadweight loss under cartelization, the reduction in the subsidy would always 
be lower than the present value of the costs of cartelization  to shippers. This 
effect exactly parallels the effect of cartelizing regulation on unserved commu- 
nities; hence, if regulation  cartelizes railroads, both unserved  and monopoly 
communities should be opposed to regulation. 
Under public interest regulation, the monopolized  community is made un- 
ambiguously better off. Instead of waiting for a second entrant (and possibly 
subsidizing it) to obtain lower prices, the community can expect lower prices 
as soon as regulation is implemented. In comparison with unserved communi- 
ties, monopolized  communities derive immediate benefit  from lower prices, 
rather than the former’s discounted benefits after entry occurs. Because a larger 
stake in the outcome leads to more effective political organization for change, 
30. Unserved communities would prefer a system that expropriates fixed costs hut not capital 
costs at the margin, because the first-best agreement between a railroad and a community is for 
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support for public interest regulation should be greater in monopolized com- 
munities than in unserved areas. 
If regulation expropriates capital, the main effects are to transfer the wealth 
of  railroads  to shippers and to halt  railroad  investment. Although railroad 
capital would have to be replaced eventually and perhaps expanded, requiring 
that the community at that time pay the opportunity cost of capital, in the in- 
terim the community derives an even greater benefit than under public interest 
regulation, so that monopolized communities should support this form of regu- 
lation even more intensely than they support the former. 
Competitive Communities 
As the number  of railroads  increases, a community has less to gain, and 
more to lose, from regulation. In the long run, shippers cannot do better than 
to have competitive transportation service, so in these communities regulation 
can be attractive only if it expropriates railroad capital.3' Cartelization  makes 
a community with competitive transportation unambiguously worse off. Public 
interest regulation might improve matters for a community having a railroad 
duopoly, but as the number of railroads increases, the benefit of public interest 
regulation diminishes. If a community has access to water transportation  that 
is roughly as efficient as railroads, the benefits of public interest regulation are 
also small or nonexistent. Moreover, because regulation creates process costs, 
it can be expected to reduce the welfare of competitively served communities. 
Hence, as competition increases,  support for even public  interest  regulation 
should diminish, and turn to opposition when transportation becomes reason- 
ably competitive. 
Expropriative regulation is attractive to all communities with railroads, al- 
though the benefits are greater in communities with less competition. Hence, 
if regulation is expected to be expropriative, all communities should support 
it, but support should be more intense in less competitive markets. Likewise, 
expropriative regulation should have more intense support than public interest 
regulation in all communities. 
Comprehensive Tests of  Alternative Theories 
The preceding analysis produces the basis for a comprehensive test of which 
theories animated the adoption of state railroad regulation during the Granger 
31. In theory, a community can do better than competition by  subsidizing the fixed costs and 
having price equal long-run marginal cost, which is the best possible initial entry agreement and 
the most perfect form of public interest regulation. In practice, neither the initial entry agreement 
nor regulation is likely to achieve this objective. Moreover, a community will not want to induce 
entry to the point where the competitive market price equals long-run marginal cost because to do 
so will require that it  pay multiple fixed costs through subsidies, all but  the first of which are 
economically inefficient  under the cost assumptions of the model. Thus, while it is optimal for 
the community to reach a deal with one railroad to set S  = F and P = m, it is not optimal for the 
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era. Table  1.2 summarizes the pattern  of observed support and opposition  to 
regulation in each type of community, depending on expectations concerning 
the form that regulation would take. In the table more intense support or oppo- 
sition is depicted by  more pluses and minuses in an entry, indicating differ- 
ences in support as one reads across columns and rows (but not across diago- 
nals). The relative intensities of support or opposition are important, because 
the economic theory of politics predicts that more intense preferences, all else 
equal, are likely to be more effectively represented in the political process. 
The three forms of regulation produce distinctly different patterns of sup- 
port. Cartelization is opposed everywhere, with the intensity of opposition ris- 
ing with the amount of service available. Public interest regulation is supported 
in all  communities except those  that  already  have competition, where it is 
mildly  opposed  because  it  imposes  some process  costs.  Support should  be 
most intense in communities with railroad monopolies, less intense in oligop- 
oly markets, and still less intense in unserved areas. And expropriation  is at- 
tractive in all communities except those that have no service, with the intensity 
of support among served communities declining as competition increases. 
Harsanyi’s theory of low-cost objectivity requires some slight amendments 
to the entries in table  1.2. Specifically, the two cells with negative  entries in 
rows 2 and 3 are most likely to be affected by altruistic concerns. Farmers in 
areas with competitive service only mildly oppose public interest regulation, 
and farmers in unserved areas only mildly oppose expropriation. In both cases, 
all other communities  would  support  the corresponding form of  regulation. 
Hence, in both cases the farmers mildly opposed to regulation might actually 
support it for altruistic reasons, or to retain solidarity in farmer activist organi- 
zati on s. 
The effect of each form of regulation on railroad entry is worth summariz- 
ing. Any form of regulation that reduces railroad profits in any period inhibits 
railroad investment. Communities can offset this effect by increasing their in- 
vestment subsidies. In the case of public interest regulation, unless railroads 
and communities face different costs of capital, the net effect may be to retard 
Table 1.2  Market Structure, Regulatory Orientation, and Political Support for 
Regulation 
Preregulation Structure of Railroad Market 
Expected Effect 
of Regulation  No Service  Monopoly  Oligopoly  Competition 
__~_  -  -_  ___  Cartelization 
Public interest  +  +++  ++  - 
++++  +++  +  Expropriation  _ 
Notes: + indicates support. - indicates opposition.  Within columns and rows, but  not  across 
diagonals, the number of  + and -  entries indicates strnegth of  support and opposition. For an 
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entry, but in any case economic efficiency is enhanced, for, in principle,  the 
initial subsidy and subsequent price regulation will eliminate the deadweight 
loss in monopoly periods and produce optimal timing of investments. Expro- 
priative regulation  will force communities to provide larger subsidies to en- 
trants, and because expropriative regulation creates deadweight loss, the effect 
will be to delay entry and to reduce economic efficiency. Finally, cartelization 
through regulation, by  increasing excess profits for railroads, intensifies their 
competition for the market and so reduces initial subsidies and causes the entry 
of the first railroad to occur sooner. A well-managed  cartel will also seek to 
retard investment in communities that are already served, and these communi- 
ties, expecting no price reductions if entry does occur, will have no interest in 
trying to offset this result through greater subsidies. Hence, cartelizing regu- 
lation is expected to lead to  an investment boom in unserved communities, 
but to reduced investment in other localities. 
1.5  The Illinois Constitution of 1870 
In 1870 Illinois adopted a new state constitution that was unusually detailed 
in its provisions regarding the regulation of railroads and grain warehouses.’2 
The constitution  specifically ordered the legislature to pass laws establishing 
rate ceilings for railroad service and prohibiting price discrimination  by  rail- 
roads.  Mergers  and acquisitions  of  parallel  railroads,  and mixed  storage of 
grains of different grades in warehouses were prohibited. Legislation that regu- 
lated grain warehouses more extensively was permitted, but not required. All 
of the railroad and warehouse provisions are reproduced in the appendix. 
The detailed regulatory provisions in the  1870 constitution  probably were 
in response to the difficulties the state had encountered in enacting regulatory 
statutes during the previous decade. Bills calling for railroad regulation were 
introduced regularly in  the legislature throughout  the 1860s. Although  these 
bills were ardently supported by shippers, none succeeded except for a weak 
bill that was enacted in 1869 (Miller 1971, 62-75).  An important factor in the 
defeat  of  many  of  these bills  was the argument that rate regulation  was an 
unconstitutional abrogation of contracts that would halt railroad investment. In 
1869 Governor Palmer vetoed a strong regulation bill, citing the constitutional- 
ity issue (72). At the constitutional convention, Republican delegate William 
Pierce  expressed  his  reaction  to this  position  as  follows:  “The decision of 
courts that a railroad charter is a contract between the people and the Legisla- 
ture, and that this contract is irrevocable and inviolable, must be overruled. We 
must have a new deal and new decision on this subject, and we in the conven- 
32. The Illinois Constitution of  I870 contained several other important articles, including the 
enfranchisement of racial minorities and a unique system of multimember districts for the lower 
house of the state legislature. For a complete discussion of  the 1870 constitution, see Cornelius 
1972. For comparison of the I870 Illinois Constitution to other state constitutions, see Braden and 
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tion mast  [sic]  take the initiative, and declare what the law should be in this 
regard (Illinois Constitutional Convention 1870, 1645). 
1.5.1 
The purpose of examining the adoption of a new constitution  in Illinois is 
to infer what citizens and their representatives believed about the likely effects 
of regulation, thereby testing the alternative versions of the economic theory of 
regulation. To undertake this analysis requires some extension of the economic 
theory of politics, for most of this literature deals with political activity associ- 
ated with legislation, not constitutions?’ The process of adopting a new consti- 
tution differs from the legislative process in ways that may have an important 
effect on the behavior of delegates to a convention and voters in electing dele- 
gates and ratifying their proposals. 
Superficially, the procedures for drafting a constitution and passing a statute 
are similar. In both cases popularly elected representatives  collectively com- 
promise their differences to develop language that will receive majority sup- 
port among the delegates. The result is legally enforceable provisions that con- 
strain public and private activities. 
The major differences between constitutional and legislative processes arise 
from the one-shot nature of constitutions and the requirement that voters ratify 
the product of the constitutional convention. Delegates to constitutional  con- 
ventions rarely  expect to seek reelection  to write  another constitution. The 
absence of  the possibility of reelection based on performance in office under- 
mines the presumption that the revealed preferences of delegates are linked to 
the policy preferences of  their constituents. In the modern positive theory of 
representation,  the desire to be  successful  in  seeking reelection  motivates 
elected officials to enact laws that please at least a majority of their constit- 
uent~.~~  Without the prospects for reelection, elected representatives  have no 
incentive (other than an altruistic belief that they ought to be good representa- 
tives) to pursue the interests of their constituents in writing a constitution, for 
voters have no mechanism to punish  representatives  who do not  carry  out 
their wishes. 
Two elements of a constitutional convention serve to restore the “electoral 
connection” to the behavior of representatives. One is ratification. The require- 
ment that  voters approve  the delegates’  product  does not force delegates  to 
adhere to the wishes of their specific supporters, but it does impose the require- 
ment that a majority of a state’s citizens prefer the new language to the old. In 
Illinois the fear of rejection led to an interesting procedure. Because the con- 
vention sought to achieve several forms that a majority of delegates regarded 
The Theory of Constitutional Conventions 
33. A notable exception is the work of  McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1984, 1986, 1989) on the led- 
34. See Fenno 1978 and Fiorina 1981 for classic discussions of how reelection incentives affect 
era1 Constitution. 
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as important, the delegates decided to submit all of the most controversial pro- 
visions, including the regulatory articles, to separate referenda. This procedure 
assured that the entire constitution would not be rejected because a majority of 
citizens opposed one important provision. But it also guaranteed that separate 
provisions, both opposed by a majority, could not be combined in a logroll that 
caused both to be adopted. 
The second aspect of the Illinois convention that provided an incentive for 
delegates to reflect their constituents’ interests was that many of  the delegates 
expected to have future careers in public life.’5 Even though they would  not 
face reelection as delegates, many would face some subsequent election back 
home or would become candidates for a visible appointive office. In either case 
their actions at the convention could become an issue. 
The convention also differed from the legislature in other ways. First, be- 
cause the partisan  delegates to the convention were roughly equally divided 
between Republicans and Democrats, and because the Cook County delegates 
were selected in nonpartisan elections, the organization of the convention was 
not partisan. Partisan  organization  enables the leadership  of a legislature  to 
control  the agenda, to coordinate the  activities  of  the  majority  party,  and 
thereby to have a strong influence on outcomes.36  Second, although the conven- 
tion divided into specialized committees, membership on committees was not 
self-selected  according to constituency  interests, as in a legi~lature.~~  Hence, 
committee members were more likely to be a representative sample of the dele- 
gates than is normally  the case in a legislature. Third, committee proposals 
were considered under  an  open rule-no  limitations  were  imposed on the 
number  of  amendments or the sequence in which  they  were  offered. Thus, 
unlike the circumstances in most legislative bodies, neither a committee nor 
the leaders of the body were in a position to offer an “all or nothing” bargain 
to legislators that varied substantially from the preferences of a majority.38 
All of these features reduced the extent to which the outcome of the conven- 
tion was likely to reflect a partisan logroll among special interests, which is a 
common problem of legislatures (Lowi 1979; Ripley and Franklin  1984). On 
balance, these characteristics of the constitutional convention probably served 
to attenuate the strength of the connection between delegates and constituents, 
especially on issues in which interests have a narrow  geographic base. Com- 
mercial farmers, however, were influential and well-organized throughout Illi- 
35. From the records of the convention, we have been able to identify among the eighty-live 
delegates one future US.  senator, two future members of the House of Representatives, two future 
judges, three future state senators, and twelve future members of  the state assembly. The  162 
delegates to the  1848 Illinois Constitutional  Convention produced  seven representatives,  eight 
state legislators, seven judges, live U.S.  senators, one governor, three delegates to the 1862 consti- 
tutional convention, three delegates to the 1870 convention, one delegate to both conventions, and 
one U.S. Supreme Court Justice. See Cornelius  1972, 30. 
36. See Cox and McCubbins 1993, chaps. 4 and 5. 
37. On self-selection, see Shepsle 1978 and Weingast and Marshall 1988. 
38. For the procedural basis of  committee power, see Shepsle and Weingast 1981. 36  Mark T. Kanazawa and Roger G. Noll 
nois in 1870. Their interests were largely homogeneous, except with respect to 
the effects of differences  in the market structure of  local transportation.  The 
influence of the  railroads was more indirect, arising  through  their ability to 
organize campaign support for candidates and positions reflecting railroad in- 
terests, and to lobby elected delegates. Hence, thc influence of railroads can be 
expected to have been somewhat greater among delegates than among citizens, 
although this effect was certainly limited by  the fact that their primary oppo- 
nents, commercial farmers, were also effectively organized. 
These theoretical conclusions can be tested by  comparing voting behavior 
on  the  floor  of  the  convention  to  subsequent ratification  votes  of  citizens. 
Hence, our empirical analysis will proceed  in two stages: an examination  of 
the results from the referendum disaggregated by the districts that elected dele- 
gates to the convention, and a similar examination of the votes at the conven- 
tion for the same provisions. 
1.5.2  Data and Methods 
To ascertain the basis of  support for the regulatory  provisions in the  1870 
Illinois Constitution, and to test the alternative theories of regulation, we have 
undertaken an empirical  analysis of  the votes  in the ratification  election and 
the constitutional  convention on the provisions that  dealt with regulation  of 
railroads and grain warehouses. Here we report our results with respect to rail- 
road regulation. ")  Our analysis uses county-level data because the delegates to 
the constitutional  convention  were elected from  either  a single county  or a 
combination of counties. The independent variables were selected to capture 
two factors that, according to the theoretical discussion in preceding sections, 
ought to have influenced constituency  interests and hence votes. One set of 
variables measures the extent to which organized shipper interests were pres- 
ent in a district. The other set of  independent  variables reflects the state of 
competition in transportation within the district. 
To  measure the political importance of farmers. we use the number of  farms 
per capita (PCFARMS) and grain production  per farm (PFPROD). The first 
variable is a measure of numerosity, while the second is a measure of the eco- 
nomic  stakes of  farmers  in thc transportation  system. Interest-group  theory 
argues that the stakes per membcr of  a group motivate their participation  in 
the political process. The only other major shipping interest in rural counties 
was the coal industry. Although the historical record provides no evidence that 
the coal industry played any significant public role in the debate about railroad 
regulation, it was an organized interest that had a stake in transportation access 
and prices. Therefore, bituminous coal production in a county (COALPROD) 
was also included as an independent variable. 
39. A complete analysis ol  the railroad and grain-ele\ator provisions i\ undertakcn in Kann/;iw;r 
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To  measure  the extent of  railroad  service in a county, we  have examined 
county  railroad  maps  of  Illinois,  subdivided  into quarter  townships  (nine 
square miles). The measure of access to railroad  service (RACCESS) is the 
fraction of quarter townships through which a line of rail passes. To measure 
the extent of railroad competition, we use two variables. The first is the inverse 
of the number of  independent railroads (HERF)  in the county, except that if no 
railroads are present, this variable is zero. HERF is the Herfindahl index if all 
railroads have equal market shares, which in this case is a reasonable measure 
of competition. Once a rail line is constructed, it can provide a wide range of 
quantities of service at roughly a constant long-run marginal cost by  simply 
increasing the frequency of trains and the number of cars per train. Hence, the 
appropriate measure of effective market share is capacity, and this is roughly 
equal among railroads once a track has been laid. 
HERF is not likely to measure the extent of railroad competition precisely 
because farmers might not find every railroad in a county equally accessible. 
Hence, we created a variable (RAILSDIF) that is the prediction error of a re- 
gression  of  the  number  of  railroads  in a county  on  RACCESS. RAILSDIF 
measures the extent to which actual competition differs from that which would 
be expected, given the amount of access in the county. 
To measure water transportation,  we took  into account  the availability of 
transportation to European markets using river shipments through St. Louis to 
New  Orleans, and then  transshipment  by  ocean  freighter.  River  shipments 
through St. Louis represented  a small fraction of Illinois production  in 1870, 
but  they  were  nonetheless  sufficient  to  make rivers  a plausible  competitive 
threat.  In  1870 the  St. Louis Board  of  Trade reported  980 arrivals and 960 
departures of riverboats from the upper Mississippi, and 3 12 arrivals and 3 18 
departures  for the  Illinois  River  (Morgan  1871, 37). In  1871 St.  Louis  ac- 
counted for approximately  19 million bushels of transshipped grains, 6 million 
of  which  arrived  by  riverboat  from  the  upper  Mississippi  or the  Illinois, 
whereas Chicago accounted for about 72 million bushels (27,41). At the time 
of  the Illinois  Constitutional  Convention,  St. Louis  traders  perceived  them- 
selves to be losing the competition  with Chicago, but not for lack of  trying. 
Instead, they  attributed  their fate to their superior morality: “while we  may 
strive to increase our grain trade in every legitimate way, we must guard against 
all movements which would tend to bring our trade and our Exchange into the 
disrepute which has become so notorious at the grain depot at the foot of the 
lake” (27). To  measure this unsuccessful but more honorable competition, we 
constructed  dummy variables  for the Mississippi,  Illinois, and  Ohio Rivers, 
each of which took the value of one for a county that contained a port on that 
river and zero otherwise. 
An enduring debate in empirical studies of voting behavior is whether ideol- 
ogy and party measure an independent element of  policy preferences (a taste 
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coalitional aggregations of instrumental, self-interested  preference^.^" Without 
entering this debate, we nonetheless include a measure of party affiliation for 
reasons  of  conservatism.  To do so mildly biases our results  against  finding 
effects of local economic interests on voting behavior. At the time of the Illi- 
nois convention, the two major parties differed on railroad policy. The Republi- 
cans strongly favored proactive federal policies (including subsidies and land 
grants) to speed the development of the hinterland, but also favored state regu- 
lation of the railroads. The Democrats were the advocates of limited govem- 
ment. With few constituents west of the Mississippi in the areas that benefited 
most from Republican  policies, Democrats generally opposed railroad give- 
aways, but were less likely to favor regulation. To measure party (PARTY) in 
the analysis of the referendum votes, we use the fraction of the 1868 presiden- 
tial vote cast for Republican Grant against Democrat Seymour. For votes at the 
convention, we use a dummy variable that is one if the delegate was a Republi- 
can and zero otherwise. Because Cook County delegates were nonpartisan, in 
the analysis of convention votes we add another variable (COOK) that is one 
if the delegate was from Cook County and zero otherwise. We expect the coef- 
ficient on PARTY to be positive if party tastes for regulation go beyond the 
economic interests of party members for partisan or ideological reasons. 
The definitions and summary statistics of the variables are contained in table 
1.3.  The correlation matrix, shown in table 1.4, reveals relatively modest corre- 
lations among the independent variables, permitting reasonably efficient esti- 
mates of the regression parameters. 
1 S.3  The Popular Referendum 
The empirical analysis of the popular referendum examines the vote on the 
constitutional provision dealing with railroads (appendix). The dependent vari- 
able is the fraction of the vote favoring ratification (RRVOTE). This variable 
is bounded by zero and one. When interpreted as the probability that a citizen 
will vote in a particular way, the variance of the observed vote fraction depends 
on the expected vote share. Consequently, ordinary  least-squares  regression 
is inappropriate. We assume that the mechanism relating  vote share and the 
independent variables is described by a logistic function, enabling us to per- 
form a regression analysis on transformed  values of the dependent variable. 
Thus, the estimated railroad equation is 
40. For a review of this debate, see Cohen and No11  1991, chap. 5. The most important study 
by economists in support of the idea that ideology is a distinct independent variable is Kalt and 
Zupan 1984. Virtually all other studies reject their conclusion that ideological voting by legislators 
represents “shirking” of their duty to represent the interests of constituents, for a majority of con- 
stituents may share the ideological predisposition of their representative. Thus, the scholarly de- 
bate tends to center on whether measures of ideology can be made to disappear if enough variables 
measuring the  instrumental interests of  constituents, plus party  membership, are included in a 
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Table 1.3  Definitions and Summary Statistics for the County-Level 
Explanatory Variables 
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Norest  Summary statistics based on  101 observations (excluding Cook County). RACCESS = 
percentage of quarter townships within the county with at least one rail line. RAILSDIF = differ- 
ence between the actual number of different rail companies and the number predicted by  a least 
squares linear regression on rail access. HERF = equal-shares Herfindahl  index; defined as IIN, 
where N  is the number of different rail companies owning rail lines. PFPROD = production of 
wheat. corn, and oats, in thousands of bushels per farm. PCFARMS =  number of farms per capita. 
PARTY = percentage of total  1868 presidential vote going to Grant. COALPROD = production 
of bituminous coal, in millions of tons. MISSISSR, OHIOR, ILLINR = dummy variables of zero 
or one, indicating presence of a port town on the Mississippi, Ohio, or Illinois River. 
6, + b,RACCESS + b,HERF 
t  b,PFPROD  -k  b,PCFARMS 
In  [RRVOTEI(l -  RRVOTE)] = + ~sCOALPROD  f b$ARn 
t  b,MISSISSR  t  bJLLINR 
t  b,OHIOR  + b,,RAILSDIF. 
(7) 
To correct for heteroscedasticity, we estimate the parameters of this equation 
using the method of weighted least squares.41 
The regression results are presented in table 1.5. All of the variables are at 
least marginally  significant by conventional statistical tests except the meas- 
ures of competition  from riverboats along the Ohio and Illinois Rivers. Table 
1.6 contains the partial derivatives of the vote share with respect to the inde- 
pendent variables. Table 1.7 presents the predicted vote share when a specific 
variable takes minimum and maximum sample values while all other variables 
take their mean values. The results in table 1.7 are the most useful for testing 
hypotheses about the beliefs of voters concerning the effects of regulation. 
The first  important  observation  from table  1.7  is that  railroad  regulation 
commands majority support in all cases, which is strongly inconsistent with 
the view that regulation would form a railroad cartel. This result is also weakly 
inconsistent with the other theories. Public interest regulation  should be op- 
posed in competitive localities, and expropriative regulation should be resisted 
41. See. for example, Kmenta 1986, 551-52. Table 1.4  Correlation Matrix for County-Level Regression Variables 
RACCESS  RAILSDIF  HERF  PFPROD  PCFARMS  PARTY  COALPROD  MISSISSR  OHIOR  ILLINR 
RACCESS  1.00 
RAILSDIF  0.00  I .oo 
HERF  0.13  -0.38  1.00 
PFPROD  0.34  0.09  0.19  1.00 
PCFARMS  -0.30  -0.19  0.11  -0.26  1 .oo 
PARTY  0.27  -0.18  0.07  0.12  -0.03  1 .oo 
COALPROD  0.26  0.25  -0.12  0.04  -0.20  0.09  1 .oo 
MISSISSR  0.03  0.01  -0.05  0.13  -0.10  -0.08  0.24  1 .oo 
OHIOR  -0.25  -0.10  -0.10  -0.29  -0.12  -0.07  -0.06  -0.10  1 .oo 
ILLINR  0.16  0.16  0.00  0.15  -0.25  -0.16  -0.03  -0.20  -0.10  1.00 41  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of 1870 
Table 1.5  Weighted Logit Estimation of the Determinants of the Popular Vote 
on the Railroad Article 
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Norrs:  Figures  in parentheses  arc  standard  /-statistic$. The  significance  tests  for  RACCESS. 
HERE PFPROD. PCFARMS, COALPROD. MISSISSR. OHIOR. and ILLINR are all one-tailed 
tests; the remainder arc two-tailed tests. 
"Significant at 90 percent. ""Signiticant  at 95 percent. ***Significant at 99 percent. 
Table 1.6  Effects of Explanatory Variables on Popular Support for Railroad 
Regulation 
On Missis5ippi  Not on Mississippi 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RACCESS  0.293  0.299  0.2 I9  0.232 
RAILSDIF  0.068  0.052  0.050  0.039 
HERF  ~  -0.065  -  -0.048 
PFPROD  0.135  0.146  0.101  0.1  on 
PCFARMS  1.023  1.094  0.764  an12 
PARTY  0.996  0.975  0.744  0.724 
COALPROD  0.35 I  0.353  0.262  0.262 
Note: These values are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory variables 42  Mark T. Kanazawa and Roger G. Noll 
Table 1.7  Predicted Vote Shares in Support of Railroad Regulation in Popular 
Referendum 
Variable  At Sample Minimum (%)  At Sample Maximum (9%) 
RACCESS  78.2  89.5 
RAILSDIF  67.6  91.3 
PFPROD  76.7  92.2 
PCFARMS  77.  I  89.6 
PARTY  63.7  97.0 
COALPROD  83.3  96.0 
MISSISSR  84.0  16.5 
Note: The probability  values  for  RACCESS, RAILSDIF, PFPROD, PCFARMS,  PARTY, and 
COALPROD are calculated at the mean values of  all other variables, with MISSISSR assumed 
equal to  zero. The probability  values for MISSISSR  are calculated  at the mean  values  of  all 
other variables. 
in unserved  areas. The latter  result  can  be  reversed  if  communities have  a 
higher discount rate than railroads, and universal support for regulation is also 
consistent with the low-cost altruism theory. 
Table 1.7 also reveals that greater production per farm and bituminous coal 
production, the measures of interest-group stakes in shipping, are strongly as- 
sociated with greater support for regulation. Likewise, the measure of the pro- 
portion of citizens involved in agriculture, farms per capita, is also positively 
associated with vote share, although this relationship is weaker and less statis- 
tically significant than the other two. Together these results indicate that pro- 
ducers of primary products with high economic stakes in shipping were most 
supportive  of  regulation,  which  also  strongly  contradicts  the  cartelization 
theory. 
The variables measuring  competition  also tell  an interesting  story. Areas 
served by  several railroads have a high value for RAILSDIF and a low value 
for HERE These areas exhibited  stronger  support  for regulation  than areas 
with less service. This result is inconsistent  with the public  interest  theory, 
which predicts declining support for regulation as competition increases, but 
is not inconsistent with the expropriation hypothesis. Areas with limited access 
and a single railroad can be conceptualized as a combination of two communi- 
ties, one monopolized and the other unserved. The area with access reaps large 
benefits from the price reductions under expropriation, but the unserved area 
faces costs due to the halt in railroad investment. Consequently, districts with 
low access and few railroads would contain voters who intensely favor expro- 
priative regulation and others who intensely oppose it. 
The coefficients on the river variables all have the same sign, although only 
the Mississippi  is statistically  significant. The negative  coefficients  on these 
variables are most consistent  with  the public  interest hypothesis:  areas with 
competition  in transportation  have nothing to gain from a regulatory regime 
that attempts to mimic competition. In addition, this variable also measures an 
interest group: citizens engaged in river shipping in a port town. River shippers 43  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of  1870 
would oppose expropriation  of the railroads because it would undercut their 
business. Hence, the river coefficients do not refute this hypothesis. 
In summary, the analysis of the popular referendum  on railroad regulation 
strongly supports the traditional story that the basis of support for regulation 
was commercial  agriculture in rural areas and overwhelmingly rejects the hy- 
pothesis that regulation would facilitate railroad cartels. The results also con- 
firm modern interest-group  analysis, finding that farm areas with higher per 
capita stakes in agriculture  supported  regulation  more strongly, and that an- 
other organized shipping interest that has not been mentioned in the literature, 
coal mining, also strongly supported regulation. Moreover, the results support 
the hypothesis that the extent of transportation competition also influenced the 
vote. The pattern of results regarding the extent of rail development indicates 
that many citizens voted as if they believed that expropriation of railroad capi- 
tal was a likely result of regulation. Nevertheless, because all areas-including 
areas without  service-produced  substantial majorities for regulation,  a ma- 
jority of  voters behaved as if they believed  that regulation  would  not inhibit 
warranted railroad  investment. The regulatory  theory  that is most consistent 
with these results is the public interest theory. 
1  S.4  The Constitutional Convention Votes 
The proceedings of  the  constitutional  convention  contain  nearly  seventy 
pages of discussion of railroad  and grain warehouse  regulation  and a dozen 
roll call votes on these issues. Our analysis focuses on one of the four votes 
that dealt specifically with price regulation of railroads4*  This vote dealt with 
the most radical departure of railroad regulation that was proposed in the con- 
stitution, the provision instructing the legislature to pass a law that established 
rate ceilings for all shipments. This went beyond the common law prohibition 
against price discrimination to control the overall tariff level. The actual vote 
was whether to eliminate this part of section 12 of the railroad article. 
In the regression analysis. the dependent variable is the vote cast by a dele- 
gate, defined as one if the delegate voted to retain the provision. As before, the 
voting equation was estimated  using  logit analysis, although the meaning of 
the equation is slightly different because of the nature of the dependent vari- 
able. Here the predicted value of the dependent variable measures the intensity 
of a delegate’s support. The standard interpretation of these values is that the 
basis for predicting votes is whether a delegate’s score is greater or less than 
.5; however, except for a value of  S,  the predicted  intensity scores are not 
interpreted as voting probabilities, so that weighted least squares regression is 
not appropriate. 
We expect that the independent variables will be somewhat less powerful in 
the convention equation than  in  the  referendum  equation, for two  reasons. 
First, following the interest-group theory, railroads should be more influential 
42. All four votes are reported in Kanazawa and Noll 1993,  and all produce broadly similar re- 
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at the convention than in the referendum. Second, due to the nature of elections 
involving partisan nominees, convention delegates should represent a compro- 
mise between central preferences  among members of their party  and central 
preferences within their constituency; however, most of the independent vari- 
ables measure the latter. 
As explained above, the Cook County delegates were nonpartisan. They also 
represented segments of the county, so that the county-level data are less pre- 
cise measures  for these  delegates.  For  delegates  who represented  multiple 
counties, we calculated the values of the independent variables for each county, 
and then computed their weighted average, using as weights the fraction of a 
delegate’s votes accounted for by each of the countie~.~’  The rationale is that 
delegates will orient their representation to the constituents who elected them. 
Table 1.8 contains the results of the regressions on the convention vote, table 
1.9 shows the partial derivatives of  the dependent variable for each indepen- 
dent variable, and table 1.10  contains the predicted probabilities of a proregu- 
latory vote for extreme values of the railroad access variable, assuming others 
take mean values, for regression 3 in table 1.8. 
The most important  result  is that  support  for regulation  was  not  as over- 
whelming in the convention as in the popular vote. About three-fourths of the 
delegates voted for price regulation in this vote, and the proportion was under 
two-thirds on another vote that obligated railroads to provide service to all who 
wanted  it. In  the referendum  the railroad  provision  received  at least a two- 
thirds majority in every county. Thus, between one-fourth and one-third of the 
delegates voted contrary to the preferences of a large majority of their constit- 
uents. This result is consistent with the notion that an organized special interest 
with few members but high stakes, like the railroads, will be more influential 
among elected officials than among voters. 
Almost all of  the explanatory  power in the convention  regression  comes 
from two variables: railroad access and farms per capita. Delegates from areas 
with  more completely  developed  railroad  systems  were  substantially  more 
likely to  vote for regulation. Indeed, for delegates from unserved  areas, the 
probability of voting for regulation, all else equal, was under 20 percent. HERF 
is  positively  associated  with  support  for  regulation,  indicating  somewhat 
greater support in  areas with fewer railroads. RAILSDIF also has a positive 
coefficient, indicating the opposite relation picked up by HERF; however, the 
coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. Likewise, the river variables 
have small and statistically insignificant coefficients. In general, these results 
support the view that all areas with railroads wanted regulation, but that mo- 
nopolized  areas supported  regulation  most  strongly.  These results  are  most 
consistent with the expropriation hypothesis, primarily because delegates from 
43. Data are taken from Illinois Secretary of State n.d. 45  The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois Constitution of 1870 
Table 1.8  Logit Results for VOTE3 
CONSTANT  -4.88** 
RACCESS  9.09** 
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Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard t-statistics. Number of observations = 66. The signifi- 
cance tcats lor RACCESS, HERF. PFPROD, PCFARMS, COALPROD, MISSISSR, and ILLINR 
are all one-tailed tests; the remainder arc two-tailed tests. 
"Significant at 909.  ""Significant  at 95%. ""Significant  at 99%. 
Table 1.9  Effects of Explanatory Variables on Delegate Voting on VOTE3 
dPldX 
Republicans  Democrats 
Not on  On  Not on  On 
Variable  Mississippi Rivcr  Mississippi River  Mississippi River  Mississippi River 
RACCESS  1.283  0.673  2.3 I3  1.533 
RAILSDIF  0.125  0.066  0.226  0.150 
HERF  0.296  0. I55  0.533  0.353 
PFPROD  -0.015  -0.008  -0.026  -0.018 
PCFARMS  5.359  2.810  9.659  6.400 
COALPROD  -0.45  1  -0.236  -0.812  -0.538 
Nore: These values are based on equation  (3) in table  1.8 and are calculated at  the mean values of  the 
explanatory variables. except for PARTY and MISSISSR. 
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Table 1.10  Predicted Probabilities of Support for Regulation at Varying Levels 
of Railroad Access, VOTE3 
At Sample Mean 
At Sample Minimum  (RACCESS =  At Sample Maximum 
(RACCESS = 0)  ,295)  (RACCESS = ,530) 
Democrats  0.085 





Nore: These predicted  probabilities are based on equation (3) in table 1.8. All other explanatory 
variables are set at their sample means, except for MISSISSR, which is assumed to he zero. 
unserved areas behaved  as if  they bought the argument of the railroads  that 
regulation would prevent the extension of service to their areas. 
Another  interesting  feature of  the vote is that  the measures  of  organized 
interests within the district generally do not explain votes by delegates. Neither 
production per farm nor bituminous coal production is statistically significant, 
and the latter has the wrong sign. To  the extent shipper organizations actively 
influenced delegates, they did  not do so on  the basis of  the  specific factors 
giving rise to effective organization in the district. 
Finally, party affiliation appears to have been unimportant in the convention, 
even though party orientation was important in the popular vote. As indicated 
in table 1.10, Democrats were less likely to vote for regulation than were Re- 
publicans, but partisan differences apparently were captured by the indepen- 
dent variables measuring constituency interests. 
Broadly speaking, voting at the convention was less consistent than the pop- 
ular vote with the view that regulation  would  improve the efficiency of the 
railroads,  and more consistent than  the popular  vote with the expropriation 
hypothesis. Of course, these results do not necessarily reveal  what the dele- 
gates personally believed; the results fundamentally  show that railroads  had 
the most success with delegates from areas without service, and less success 
with delegates from monopolized areas than from more competitive ones. But 
delegates from competitive areas were too willing to vote for regulation to be 
consistent with the public interest theory. Either they thought their constituents 
would benefit from expropriation of railroad capital, or they were casting votes 
for farmers elsewhere who suffered from monopoly. 
1.6  Subsequent Railroad Investment 
If  many delegates  and voters behaved as if they thought regulation  would 
expropriate railroad capital, subsequent events indicate that their expectations 
were in error. In 1903 Charles R. Detrick published extensive research on the 
effects of the Granger laws on railroad investment. Detrick found no substan- 
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either between Granger and other states during the  187Os, or before and after 
the enactment of the Granger laws.44  We reprise his major results here. 
Detrick found that throughout the  1870s construction in the four Granger 
states was almost identical  to construction in  four adjacent  states that were 
very similar but that did not enact railroad  regulation  at this  time (Indiana, 
Michigan, Nebraska, and Missouri). From  1871 to  1873, when  the Granger 
states attempted unsuccessfully to enact railroad regulation, rail trackage grew 
44.5 percent in the Granger states, 45.4 percent in the other four, and 33 per- 
cent nationwide. In 1874 and 1875, when all four Granger states had Granger 
laws, their rail trackage grew by 6 percent, while in the other four states growth 
was 4.1 percent and in the nation as a whole 5.5 percent. In Illinois between 
1871 and  1873, after the constitution was ratified but before a permanent en- 
abling law was passed, railroad trackage grew by  37 percent, compared to 17 
percent in neighboring Indiana. From 1873 to  1875, the first two years after 
the Granger act was passed, Illinois trackage grew by  11.8 percent, compared 
to 8.6 percent in Indiana. Finally, Detrick finds that net earnings of railroads 
actually grew faster in the Granger states than in the four comparison  states 
from 1873 to 1876. 
The only state in which enactment of regulation appears to have had a major 
effect on railroad construction was Minnesota. From 1871 to 1873 Minnesota 
trackage  increased  by  79 percent,  but  between  1874 and  1875, the  year in 
which its Granger law was in effect, growth fell to 2.1 percent. After repeal, 
construction recovered somewhat, with trackage up  10 percent between  1876 
and  1877 and approximately  another 40 percent  from  1877 to  1879. These 
results are very difficult  to explain, because Minnesota’s regulatory law was 
not the most Draconian. Wisconsin’s Potter Act took that honor, and Wisconsin 
trackage grew by  36.6 percent from 1873 to 1875 under this statute. Detrick 
also found that, during the year of regulation in Minnesota, railroad net earn- 
ings jumped by 80 percent, the second largest figure he reports (Nebraska re- 
ported growth of 400 percent). His overall conclusion: “[Als regards railroad 
building and receipts, [the Granger states] suffered less than the United States 
as a whole, and very much less than the southern and western  states” (1903, 
256). 
Why did this investment  in railroads persist? The 1871 Annual Report of 
the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission provides two explanations: 
The construction of railroads in this State during the past year, especially in 
the central and southern portion of it, has been pushed with unusual energy 
and activity. This has been stimulated, and chiefly occasioned, by the anxi- 
ety of the people living in the various localities interested to secure the con- 
44. Detrick  1903, 248-56.  Railroad construction and profits did tail off nationwide in the late 
1870s. but Detrick finds that a national rccession, not state regulatory actions, is the more plausible 
explanation because the slowdown hit all areas, not just the states that  instituted railroad regu- 
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struction of  the roads before the local subscriptions  voted  in their aid by 
counties, cities and towns should be lost by the lapse of time or otherwise, 
and also by  an anxiety on the part of the older and more powerful corpora- 
tions to protect themselves against probable competitions or encroachments 
upon what they call their “legitimate territory,” by  reason of the construc- 
tion of  these new  lines. (Illinois Railroad  and Warehouse Commissioners 
1871, 9) 
Thus, local governments offered attractive subsidies to build new lines, and the 
established railroads concluded deals because they feared competitive entry if 
they did not. All of this took place after ratification of the Illinois Constitution 
of  i  870, but before passage of the permanent  enabling  statute in  1873. This 
investment boom by the railroads is not consistent with the view expressed in 
the constitutional debate that regulation would expropriate capital. 
1.7  Conclusions 
The primary purpose of the research reported here is to advance understand- 
ing  of  the  fundamental  economic and  political  causes of  regulation  in  the 
United States. The first application of economic regulation-public  control of 
prices and entry-was  transportation. For the most part, scholars have focused 
attention on the origins of federal regulation of  railroads, but for thrce decades 
before the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, several states at- 
tempted to regulate railroads. In many ways the economics and politics of  state 
railroad regulation were more interesting than the circumstances surrounding 
passage of thc  Interstate Commerce Act, for during the thirty  years prior  to 
I887 the railroads were rapidly expanding their route network throughout the 
Midwest and West, and national politics was much more contentious and un- 
stable. 
Because railroads were expanding rapidly in the decade after the Civil War, 
the effect of regulation on investment must be an extremely important compo- 
nent of an analysis of the economic and political causes of regulation. Hence, 
our analysis of  the stakes of various economic interests in the Granger laws 
examines both the short-run price effects and the long-run effects on invest- 
ment  and competition  of  each possible form of  regulation  that  might  arise, 
whether a railroad cartel, a “public interest” simulation of competition, or ex- 
propriation of railroad capital. 
The most important conclusion from our research is that state regulation of 
railroads was not adopted at the behest of the regulated to help them manage 
a more effective cartel. The railroads energetically  fought the Granger laws 
and  managed  to  have  them  repealed  or emasculated  in three  of  the  four 
Granger states. Shipper interests, especially  in agriculture as represented  by 
new farmer activist organizations such as the Grangers, were strong, successful 
advocates of  regulation, and delegates representing farmers were responsible 
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for ratification of  the  constitution,  most  citizens  behaved  as if  the  effect  of 
regulation would be to lower prices, but not to cause profits to be too low to 
induce further railroad investment. More citizens voted as if they believed that 
regulation would expropriate the capital of railroads than as if they expected 
regulation to produce a railroad cartel. Furthermore,  because the railroad ar- 
ticle passed by  large majorities throughout the state, citizens in areas served 
by several railroads apparently voted altruistically, favoring a policy that would 
benefit other farmers in areas that were less well served. Finally, a substantial 
minority of delegates to the constitutional convention clcarly acted contrary to 
the wishes of an overwhelming majority of their constituents by voting to kill 
or to emasculate the regulatory articles during the convention proceedings. The 
railroads were much more influential at the convention, especially among dele- 
gates representing  areas without railroad service, than they were in the popu- 
lar referendum. 
The Granger era raises potentially rich research issues that have been largely 
unexplored using the tools of modern economic analysis. The short life of the 
Granger movement and, except in Illinois, the quick repeal of the Granger laws 
remain  unexplained.  Likewise,  the  adoption  of  regulatory  statutes in  other 
states after the demise of  the Grangers also merits furthcr study. These issues 
suggcst a  larger question,  thus  far largely  unexamined,  about how  agrarian 
activism, a prominent feature of  American politics throughout  the latter half 
of the nineteenth  century, affected  public  policy. Finally, a more  systematic 
study of the relationship between railroad performance-prices  and growth- 
and regulation  is needed  to understand  fully  the circumstances confronting 
members of Congress and their constituents when Wubash finally emasculated 
state regulation and federal legislation was enacted as a substitute. 
Appendix 
Railroad and Grain Warehouse Provisions of  the 1870 
Illinois Constitution 
Article 11 :  Corporations (Railroad Provisions) 
Section  9. Every railroad corporation  organized or doing business  in this 
State, under the laws or authority  thereof,  shall have and maintain  a public 
office or place in this State for the transaction of  its business, where transfers 
of stock may be made and in which shall be kept, for public inspection, books, 
in which  shall be recorded  the  amount of  capital  stock  subscribed, and by 
whom; the names of the owners of this stock, and the amounts owned by them 
respectively, the amount of stock paid in, and by  whom; the transfers of said 
stock; the amount of its assets and liabilities, and the name and place of resi- 50  Mark T. Kanazawa and Roger G. Noll 
dence of its officers. The directors of  every railroad corporation shall annually 
make a report, under oath, to the Auditor of Public Accounts, or some officer 
to be designated by law, of all their acts and doings; which report shall include 
such matters relating to railroads as may be prescribed by law. And the General 
Assembly  shall pass laws enforcing, by  suitable penalties,  the provisions of 
this section. 
Section 10. The rolling stock, and all other movable property belonging to 
any railroad company or corporation in this State, shall be considered personal 
property, and shall be liable to execution and sale, in the same manner as the 
personal property of individuals, and the General Assembly shall pass no law 
exempting any such property from execution and sale. 
Section 11. No railroad corporation  shall consolidate its stock, property or 
franchises with any other railroad corporation owning a parallel or competing 
line; and in  no case shall any consolidation  take place,  except upon public 
notice given, of at least sixty days, to all stockholders, in such manner as may 
be provided by law. A majority of the directors of any railroad corporation now 
incorporated or hereafter to be incorporated, by the laws of  this State, shall be 
citizens and residents of this State. 
Section  12. Railroads heretofore constructed or that may hereafter be con- 
structed in this State, are hereby declared public highways, and shall be free to 
all persons for the transportation of their persons and property thereon, under 
such regulations as may be prescribed by law. And the General Assembly shall, 
from time to time, pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges 
for the transportation  of passengers  and freight on the different railroads  in 
this State. 
Section 13. No railroad corporation shall issue any stock or bonds, except 
for money, labor or property actually received and applied to the purposes for 
which such corporation was created; and all stock dividends, and other ficti- 
tious increase of the capital stock or indebtedness of any such corporation shall 
be void. The capital stock of  no railroad corporation shall be increased for any 
purpose, except upon giving sixty days' public notice, in such manner as may 
be provided by law. 
Section  14. The exercise of  the power and right  of eminent domain shall 
never  be so construed  or abridged  as to prevent the taking, by  the General 
Assembly, of the property  and franchises of  incorporated  companies already 
organized, and subjecting them to the public necessity, the same as of individu- 
als. The right of trial, by jury, shall be held inviolate in all trials of claims for 
compensation, when, in the exercise of the said right of eminent domain, any 
incorporated company shall be interested either for or against the exercise of 
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Section  15. The General  Assembly  shall pass laws to correct abuses and 
prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger 
tariffs on the different railroads in this State, and to enforce such laws by ade- 
quate penalties,  to the extent, if necessary for that purpose,  of  forfeiture  on 
their property and franchises. 
Article 13: Warehouses 
Section  1. All  elevators  or storehouses  where grain  or other property is 
stored for a compensation, whether the property stored be kept separate or not, 
are declared to be public warehouses. 
Section 2. The owner, lessee or manager of each and every public warehouse 
situated in any town or city of not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, 
shall make weekly statements, under oath, before some officer to be designated 
by law, and keep the same posted in some conspicuous place in the office of 
such warehouse, and shall also file a copy for public examination in such place 
as shall be designated by  law, which  statement shall correctly  set forth the 
amount and grade of each and every kind of grain in such warehouse, together 
with such other property as may be stored therein, and what warehouse receipts 
have been issued and are, at the time of making such statement, outstanding 
therefor;  and  shall,  on the  copy posted  in  the  warehouse,  note  daily  such 
changes as may be made in the quantity and grade of grain in such warehouse; 
and the different grades of grain shipped in separate lots shall not be mixed 
with inferior  or superior grades,  without the consent of  the  owner or con- 
signee thereof. 
Section 3. The owner of property  stored in any warehouse or holder of a 
receipt for the same shall always be at liberty to examine such property stored 
and all the books and records of the warehouse in regard to such property. 
Section 4. All railroad companies and other common camers on railroads 
shall weigh or measure grain at points where it is shipped, and receipt for the 
full amount, and shall be responsible for the delivery of such amount to the 
owner or consignee thereof, at the place of  destination. 
Section 5. All railroad companies receiving and transporting  grain in bulk 
or otherwise shall deliver the same to any consignee thereof, or to any elevator 
or public warehouse to which it may be consigned, provided such consignee 
or the elevator or public warehouse can be reached by any track owned, leased 
or used, or which can be used by  such railroad  companies; and all railroad 
companies shall permit  connections to  be made with their track so that any 
such consignee and  any  public  warehouse,  coal bank or coal  yard  may  be 
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Section 6. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass all necessary 
laws to prevent  the issue of  false and fraudulent  warehouse  receipts,  and to 
give full effect to this Article of the Constitution, which shall be liberally con- 
strued so as to protect producers  and shippers. And  the enumeration  of the 
remedies herein named shall not be construed to deny to the General Assembly 
the power to prescribe by law such other and further remedies as may be found 
expedient, or to deprive any person of existing common law remedies. 
Section 7. The General Assembly shall pass laws for the inspection of grain, 
for the protection of producers, shippers and receivers of grain and produce. 
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